We consider a supervisory control problem for discrete-event systems, in which an attacker corrupts the symbols that are observed by the supervisor. We show that existence of a supervisor enforcing a specification language, in the presence of attacks, is completely characterized by controllability (in the usual sense) and observability of the specification (in a new appropriately defined sense). The new notion of observability takes into account the attacker's ability to alter the symbols received by the attacker. For attacks that correspond to arbitrary insertions/removals of symbols, the new notion of observability can be tested by checking the usual notion of observability for a set of discrete-event systems with appropriately redefined observation maps. Focusing on attacks that replace and/or remove symbols from the output strings, we construct observers that are robust against attacks and lead to an automaton representation of the supervisor. We also develop a test for observability under such replacement-removal attacks by using the so-called product automata.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in computer and network technology make cyber-physical systems prevalent in modern societies. The integration between cyber and physical components introduces serious risks of cyber attacks to physical processes. For example, it has been recently reported that attackers can adversarially control cars [1] and UAVs [2] . Moreover, the Moroochy water breach in March 2000 [3] and the StuxNet virus attack in June 2010 [4] highlight potential threats to infrastructure systems. An annual report [5] published in 2014 by the German government stated that an attacker tampered with the controls of a blast furnace in a German steel factory.
We study supervisory control for Discrete-event systems (DESs) under adversarial attacks.
DESs are dynamic systems equipped with a discrete state space and an event-driven transition structure. Such models are widely used to describe cyber-physical systems such as chemical batch plants [6] , power grids [7] , and manufacturing systems [8] . The objective of this paper is to answer the question: How do we control DESs if an attacker can manipulate the information provided by sensing and communication devices? This question encourages system designers to reconsider the supervisory control problem from the viewpoint of security. Fig. 1 shows the closed-loop system we consider, in which an observation string generated by the plant is substituted by a string corrupted by an adversarial attack. The attack changes the original string by inserting, removing, and replacing symbols, and is allowed to non-deterministically change the same original string to distinct strings. Furthermore, since we cannot foretell what an attacker will do as we design supervisors, we consider a set of possible attacks. The problem we study is how to determine if there exists a supervisor that can enforce the specification notwithstanding the attacks. Whenever such supervisor exists, we also study the problem of how to construct it. This work is inspired by the research on state estimation under sensor attacks for linear time-invariant systems developed in [9] - [11] .
Related works: Supervisory control theory has developed frameworks to handle plant uncertainties and faults; see, e.g., [12] - [14] for robust control and [15] - [17] for fault tolerant control. These studies can be used as countermeasures against attacks, but there are conceptual differences between uncertainties/faults and attacks. In fact, uncertainties/faults do not coordinate with harmful intent, whereas attackers can choose their action in order to achieve malicious purposes. For example, the stealthy deception attacks in [18] , [19] aim to inject false information without being detected by the controller. Therefore we present a new framework for supervisory control under adversarial attacks.
Several aspects of security have also been explored in the DES literature. One particular line of research aims at studying the opacity of DESs, whose goal is to keep a system's secret behavior uncertain to outsiders; see, e.g., [20] - [23] and reference therein. Intrusion detection in the DES framework has been investigated in [24] - [27] . These security methods guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of DESs, but relatively little work has been done towards studying supervisory control robustness against attacks.
An attacked plant can be modeled by a single DES with nondeterministic observations.
Supervisory control for such a DES has been studied in [28] , [29] . The major difference from the problem setting in these previous works is that in our work, the attacked output, i.e., the nondeterministic observation function, is uncertain. In other words, if G A i denotes the DES obtained by modeling the plant under an attack A i , then the problem we consider can be regarded as robust supervision for an uncertain DES in a set of possible models {G A 1 , . . . , G An }, each representing a potential type of attack.
Contributions and organization of this paper: In Section II, after defining attacks formally, we introduce a new notion of observability under attacks, which is a natural extension of conventional observability introduced in [30] , [31] . We show that there exists a partial observation supervisor that achieves a given language under attack if and only if the language is controllable in the usual sense and observable according to the new notion of observability introduced in this paper. Moreover, the desired supervisor is obtained explicitly. For attacks that correspond to arbitrary insertions/removals of symbols, the new notion of observability can be reduced to the conventional observability of a set of DESs with appropriately redefined observation maps, and the number of elements in this DES set is the square of the number of possible attacks.
In Section III, we construct an automaton representation of the supervisor derived in Section II.
The results in this section are specific to attacks that replace and/or remove specific symbols from the output string. First, we provide the mathematical formulation of replacement-removal attacks.
Then we construct an observer automaton that is resilient against such an attack, extending the result in [30] . Finally, using the observer for each possible attack, we obtain an automaton representation of the desired supervisor.
Section IV is devoted to developing a test for observability under attacks. Attacks are restricted to the replacement and/or removal of symbols in this section as well. Constructing a product automaton in [32] , we show how to test observability under replacement-removal attacks in a computationally efficient way. The computational complexity of this observability test is (Number of possible attacks)
2 × (Complexity of the conventional observability test without attacks), which is the same as in the insertion-removal attack case of Section II.
Notation and definitions
The following notation and definitions are standard in the DES literature (see, e.g., [33] , [34] ).
For a finite set Σ of event labels, we denote by |Σ| the number of elements in Σ, and by Σ * the set of all finite strings of elements of Σ, including the empty string . For a language
where uv denotes the concatenation of two strings in Σ * , and L is said to be prefix closed if
Let the set of events Σ be partitioned in two sets as Σ = Σ c ∪ Σ u with Σ c ∩ Σ u = ∅, where Σ c is called the set of controlled events and Σ u the set of uncontrolled events. For a language
Consider an observation map P : Σ → (∆ ∪ { }) that maps a set of events Σ into a set of observation symbols ∆ (augmented by the empty event ). This observation map P can be extended to map strings of events in Σ * to strings of observation symbols in ∆ * , using the rules P ( ) = and
A prefix-closed language K ⊂ L is P -observable with respect to L if
where ker P denotes the equivalence relation on Σ * defined by
and act K⊂L is a binary relation on Σ * defined as follows: The pair (w, w ) ∈ act K⊂L if (and only if) w, w ∈ K implies that there does not exist σ ∈ Σ such that neither
We will omit the underling language L when it is clear from the context.
Consider an automaton G = (X, Σ, ξ, x 0 ), where X is the set of states, Σ is the nonempty event set, ξ : X × Σ → X is the transition mapping (a partial function), and x 0 ∈ X is the initial state. We write ξ(x, σ)! to mean that ξ(x, σ) is defined. The transition function ξ can be extended to a function X × Σ * → X according to the following rule:
• For all x ∈ X, ξ(x, ) := x
• For all x ∈ X, w ∈ Σ * , and σ ∈ Σ,
The language generated by G is given by
II. SUPERVISED DISCRETE-EVENT SYSTEMS UNDER ATTACKS
In Section II A, we first introduce attacks on observation symbols and a new notion of observability under attacks. In Section II B, we present the main result of this section, which
shows that there exists a supervisor achieving a given language in the presence of attacks if and only if the language is controllable in the usual sense and observable under attacks. Next, in Section II C, we focus our attention on attacks that insert and remove symbols, and show that the new notion of observability under such attacks can be reduced to the conventional observability notion of a set of DESs.
A. Observability under attacks
By an attack, we mean the substitution of an observation string w ∈ ∆ * generated by the plant by a corrupted string y ∈ ∆ * that is exposed to the supervisor (see Fig. 1 ). The corrupted string y may differ from the original string w by the insertion, removal, or replacement of symbols.
The simplest form of attack could be modeled by a function y = A(w) that maps ∆ * to ∆ * .
However, we are interested in more general forms of attacks where the attacker is allowed to non-deterministically map the same original string w ∈ ∆ * to distinct strings y ∈ ∆ * , in order to make the task of the supervisor more difficult. We thus model attacks by a set-valued function A : ∆ * → 2 ∆ * that maps each original string w ∈ ∆ * to the set A(w) ⊂ ∆ * of all possible corrupted strings y. Note that the supervisor receives one of the strings in the set A(w), not A(w) itself. The attack map A id : ∆ * → 2 ∆ * that assigns to each string w ∈ ∆ * the set {w} containing only the original string w can be viewed as the absence of an attack.
When we design supervisors, attack maps may be uncertain due to lack of knowledge of which sensors are attacked. In this paper, we therefore consider a set of possible attacks A = {A 1 , . . . , A n }, and we are interested in the following scenario: We know the attack set A in advance, and that only one attack in the set A is conducted. In other words, the attacker is not allowed to switch between the attacks in the set A. However, when we construct a supervisor, we do not know which attack actually occurs, and hence the aim is to design a robust supervisor with respect to all attacks in A.
Example 1: Consider the language L(G) generated by the automaton G shown in Fig. 2a .
We investigate the observability under attacks of the specification language K generated by the automaton G K in Fig. 2b . The difference between G and G K is an event c from x 1 to x 3 .
The purpose of supervisory control here would be to avoid this "shortcut". We consider the observation map P defined by
and three attacks
The attack A 1 replaces each output symbol arbitrarily, so the supervisor knows from the output only whether an observable event occurs. The attack A 2 can replace the symbol a by b and the symbol d by a, respectively, whereas the attack A 3 always erases the symbol d. The goal is then to design a supervisor that enforces the specification G K , without knowing which of the three attacks is taking place. We shall return to this example later in the paper. For simplicity of notation, we denote by AP : Σ * → 2 ∆ * the attacked observation map obtained from the composition AP := A • P . We introduce a new notion of observability under a set of attacks, which can be seen as a direct extension of the conventional observability notion introduced in [30] , [31] .
Definition 2 (Observability under attacks): Given an attack set A, we say that a prefix-closed language K ⊂ L is P -observable under the attack set A if
where the relation R A,A contains all pairs of strings that may result in attacked observation maps AP and A P with a common string of output symbols, i.e.,
In view of the definition (2), the P -observability condition (1) can be restated as requiring that, for every w, w ∈ K,
or equivalently, for every w, w ∈ K,
In words, observability means that we cannot find two attacks A, A ∈ A that would result in the same observation for two strings w, w ∈ K such that (w, w ) ∈ act K⊂L , i.e., two strings w, w ∈ K such that one will transition to an element of K and the other to an element outside K, by the concatenation of the same symbol σ ∈ Σ.
First we obtain a condition equivalent to observability under attacks for controllable languages.
In the non-attacked case, this condition is used as the definition of conventional observability in the book [34, Sec. 3.7] .
Proposition 3: Suppose that the prefix-closed language K ⊂ L is controllable. Then K is Pobservable under the set of attacks A if and only if for every w, w ∈ K, σ ∈ Σ c , and A, A ∈ A, the following statement holds:
Proof: We use the necessary and sufficient condition (3) for the specification language K to be observable under attacks.
(⇒) Suppose that K is P -observable under A, and suppose that w, w ∈ K, σ ∈ Σ c , and
Then (3) directly leads to w σ ∈ K.
(⇐) Suppose that (5) holds for all w, w ∈ K, σ ∈ Σ c , and A, A ∈ A. From (3), it is enough to show that if w, w ∈ K satisfy AP (w) ∩ A P (w ) = ∅ for some A, A ∈ A, then there does
Since K is controllable, if σ ∈ Σ u and wσ, w σ ∈ L, then wσ, w σ ∈ K from (5). Moreover, for all σ ∈ Σ c , if wσ ∈ K and w σ ∈ L, then w σ ∈ K. Exchanging w and w , we also have if w σ ∈ K and wσ ∈ L, then wσ ∈ K. This completes the proof.
Example 1 (cont.): Consider the language L(G), the specification language K = L(G K ), and the attack sets A 1 , A 2 , A 3 in Example 1. Let the controllable event set be Σ c = {a, c}, and the uncontrollable event be Σ u = {b, d}. It is straightforward to show that K is controllable, and we can use Proposition 3 to verify that K is observable under the attack set A = {A 1 }. Additionally, K is observable under the attack sets A = {A 2 } and A = {A 3 }, but is not observable under
In fact, if we define w := abcda and w := wb, then A 2 P (w) = {abaa, abab, abda, abdb, bbaa, bbab, bbda, bbdb}
and hence A 2 P (w) ∩ A 3 P (w ) = ∅, but c ∈ Σ c satisfies wc ∈ L \ K and w c ∈ K. Thus K is robust with respect to symbol replacements but vulnerable to a combination of replacements and removals.
B. Existence of supervisors
Our objective in this subsection is to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a supervisor that achieves a specification language in the presence of output corruption.
To this end, we first introduce supervisors for an attack set and define controlled languages under attacks.
A P -supervisor for a language L ⊂ Σ * and an attack set A is a function f :
where AP (L) is the set of all possible output strings under the attack A, that is,
We will say that a supervisor
Given a P -supervisor f for a language L and an attack set A, the maximal language The following result provides a necessary and sufficient condition on a language K ⊂ L for the existence of a P -supervisor f for an attack set A whose minimal and maximal controlled 
and only if K is controllable and P -observable under A;
2) If K is controllable and P -observable under A, then the following map f :
When the set of attacks A contains only A id , Theorem 4 specializes to the case without attacks.
Remark 5:
As the proof below shows, in order to obtain controllability in item 1), it is enough
Proof of Theorem 4: We first prove that L max f,A = K for some A ∈ A implies the controllability of K. Pick some wordw ∈ KΣ u ∩ L. Such a word must be of the formw = wσ ∈ L such that w ∈ K and σ ∈ Σ u . The supervisor f is defined for all the strings y that are produced by an attacker. Therefore, if w ∈ K ⊂ L, then f (y) is defined for every y ∈ AP (w). Since f is a valid supervisor, any uncontrollable event belongs to f (y), in particular, σ ∈ f (y). Since
controllability can be obtained in the same way.
Next we prove that K is P -observable under an attack set A by using the fact that K =
To do so, we employ the statement (4), which is equivalent to observability under attacks. Pick a pair of words w, w ∈ K such that ∃A, A s.t. AP (w) ∩ A P (w ) = ∅, and an arbitrary symbol σ ∈ Σ such that wσ, w σ ∈ L. If such a symbol σ does not exist, then all σ satisfy wσ ∈ L or w σ ∈ L, and we immediately conclude that K is observable under A from (4). If such σ exists and wσ
Since AP (w) ∩ A P (w ) = ∅, we must then have
and hence w σ / ∈ L min f,A = K. This shows that (4) holds, and therefore K is P -observable under A.
To prove the existence of the supervisor in item 1 (and also the statement in item 2), pick the supervisor f according to (6) . We prove by induction on the word length that the supervisor We show that w σ ∈ K as follows. Since w ∈ L max f,A has length n, we know by the induction hypothesis that w ∈ K. On the other hand, since w σ ∈ L max f,A , we must have
If σ ∈ Σ u , then we see from controllability that w σ ∈ K. Let us next consider the case σ ∈ Σ c .
By the definition (6) of f , σ ∈ f (y) must mean that
We therefore have
Since K is controllable and observable under A, Proposition 3 shows that w σ ∈ K. This shows that any word of length n
, it follows that any word of length n + 1 in L min f,A also belongs to K. Conversely, for a word w σ ∈ K ⊂ L of length n + 1 with σ = , we prove w σ ∈ L min f,A as follows. Since K is prefix closed, we have w ∈ K. The induction hypothesis shows that
The first statement is a consequence of the induction hypothesis (as discussed above). The second statement is a consequence of the fact that w σ ∈ K ⊂ L. As regards the third statement, if σ ∈ Σ u , then σ ∈ f (y) for all y ∈ AP (w ) by definition. It is therefore enough to show that σ ∈ Σ c leads to σ ∈ f (y), that is, the statement (7), for every y ∈ AP (w ). We obtain (7) for the particular caseĀ = A, w = w ∈ K. Thus any word of length n + 1 in K also belongs to 
C. Observability under insertion-removal attacks
In this subsection, we consider attacks that insert and remove certain symbols from output strings, and reduce observability under such attacks to the conventional observability in the non-attacked case.
Given a set of symbols α ⊂ ∆ in the observation alphabet, we define the insertion-removal attack A α : ∆ * → 2 ∆ * that maps each string u ∈ ∆ * to the set of all strings v ∈ ∆ * that can be obtained from u by an arbitrary number of insertions or removals of symbols in α. We say that A α corresponds to an attack on the output symbols in α. In this context, it is convenient to also define the corresponding α-removal observation map
The α-removal observation map can be extended to strings of events in the same way as the observation map P . This α-removal observation map allows us to define the attack A α : ∆ * → 2 ∆ * on the output symbol in α as follows:
Example 6: Let α = {t 1 } ⊂ {t 1 , t 2 }. Then R ¬α (t 1 t 2 ) = t 2 , and
The next result shows that the observability in Definition 2 under insertion-removal attacks is equivalent to the usual observability (without attacks) for an appropriate set of output maps.
Note that the composition R ¬α • P : ∆ → (∆ ∪ { }) can be regarded as an observation map (in the usual sense, i.e., without attacks).
Theorem 7: For every nonempty prefix-closed language K ⊂ L and insertion-removal attack
under the set of attacks A if and only if K is (R ¬α • P )-observable for every set α :
Theorem 7 implies that one can use the standard test for DES observability (without attacks)
in [32] to determine observability under insertion-removal attacks (Definition 2).
Remark 8 (Computational complexity of observability test for insertion-removal attacks):
Consider a language L = L(G) generated by a finite automaton G = (X, Σ, ξ, x 0 ) and a
According to Thereom 7, in order to test observability under an insertion-removal attack set A, it is enough to construct |A| 2 test automatons, each of which verifies the usual observability.
Since the computational complexity of verifying the usual observability with the test automaton is O(|X| · |R| 2 · |Σ c |) (see, e.g., [34, Sec. 3.7] ), the total complexity for this observability test
The following result is the key step in proving Theorem 7.
Lemma 9: Given any two sets α 1 , α 2 ⊂ ∆ and α := α 1 ∪ α 2 , we have that
where ker R ¬α is defined by
Proof: To prove this result, we must show that given two strings v, v ∈ ∆ * such that
, there exists a third string y ∈ ∆ * that belongs both to A α 1 (v) and A α 2 (v ).
In view of (9), this means that y ∈ ∆ * must satisfy
The desired string y can be constructed through the following steps:
1) Start with the string y 1 := R ¬α 1 (v), which is obtained by removing from v all symbols in
and the strings y 1 and v still only differ by symbols in α 1 and α 2 .
2) Construct y 2 by adding to y 1 suitable symbols in α 1 so that R ¬α 2 (y 2 ) = R ¬α 2 (v ). This is possible because y 1 and v only differ by symbols in α 1 and α 2 and y 1 has no symbols in α 1 by definition. To get R ¬α 2 (y 2 ) = R ¬α 2 (v ), we do not care about the symbols in α 2 , so we just have to insert into y 1 the symbols in α 1 that appear in v (at the appropriate locations).
3) By construction,
and hence the original v and y 2 only differ by symbols in
that is, v and y 2 only differ by symbols in α 2 . We therefore conclude that y := y 2 satisfies (12) and hence belongs to both A α 1 (v) and A α 2 (v ).
Proof of Theorem 7: By definition, K is P -observable under the set of attacks A if and only if
Also, by definition, K is (R ¬α • P )-observable for the set α := α i ∪ α j if and only if
To prove the result, it therefore suffices to show that, for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M }, we have that
To show that this equality holds, first pick a pair (w, w ) ∈ R Aα i ,Aα j , which means by the definition (2) of R Aα i ,Aα j that there exists a string y ∈ ∆ * that belongs both to A α i P (w) and A α j P (w ), and therefore
and consequently
Hence (w, w ) ∈ ker(R ¬α • P ). We have thus shown that R Aα i ,Aα j ⊂ ker(R ¬α • P ).
To prove the reverse inclusion, pick a pair (w, w ) ∈ ker(R ¬α • P ), which means that R ¬α P (w) = R ¬α P (w ) , and therefore P (w), P (w ) ∈ ker R ¬α by the definition (11) of ker R ¬α . In conjunction with Lemma 9, this leads to
Therefore we have (w, w ) ∈ R Aα i ,Aα j . This shows that ker(R ¬α • P ) ⊂ R Aα i ,Aα j , which concludes the proof.
III. REALIZATION OF SUPERVISORS UNDER ATTACKS
The objective of this section is to describe the supervisor f in (6) through an automaton for replacement-removal attacks, which will be introduced in Section III A and are a special class of the attacks considered in Section II. In Section III B, we provide a construction for an automaton that describes a supervisor for replacement-removal attacks and then formally prove in Section III C that the proposed automaton represents the supervisor f in (6).
A. Replacement-removal attack
The results in this section are specific to attacks that consist of replacement and/or removal of specific symbols from the output strings. For a given replacement-removal map φ : ∆ → 2 ∆∪{ } that maps each output symbol to a (possibly empty) set of symbols, the corresponding attack map A : ∆ * → 2 ∆ * is defined by A( ) = { } and A(yt) := w y w t : w y ∈ A(y), w t ∈ φ(t)
for all y ∈ ∆ * and t ∈ ∆. Sets of attacks of this form are called replacement-removal attack sets. Recalling that AP := A • P , we conclude from (13) that
In what follows, it will be convenient to define the inverse map AP −1 by
and extend it to languages L ∆ ⊂ ∆ * :
The following lemma provides basic properties of AP and AP −1 for a replacement-removal attack A:
Lemma 10: Consider a replacement-removal attack A.
1)
For all w, s ∈ Σ * , we have
2) Let y 1 , . . . , y m ∈ ∆ and w 1 , . . . , w n ∈ Σ. If y 1 · · · y m ∈ AP (w 1 · · · w n ), then there exist
. . .
where, for example, if
3) For all y, v ∈ ∆ * , we have
Proof: 1) If s = , then (15) holds for all w ∈ Σ * because AP ( ) = { }. For s = s 1 · · · s k with s i ∈ Σ, we obtain (15), by using (14) iteratively. Thus we have (15) holds for all w, s ∈ Σ * .
2) We prove the item 2 by induction on the word length of y 1 · · · y m . In the case m = 1, suppose that
If y 1 ∈ AP (w i ) for every i = 1, . . . , n, then y 1 ∈ AP (w 1 · · · w n ). Hence y 1 ∈ AP (w i ) for at least one i. Let y 1 ∈ AP (w i ) hold for i = j 1 , . . . , j k . It follows that there exists l ∈ {j 1 , . . . , j k } such that
The desired i 1 is such an index l.
Suppose now that the item 2 holds with y 1 · · · y k of length k ≥ 1 and that
Similarly to the case m = 1, we see that there exists i k+1 such that
Applying the induction hypothesis to y 1 · · · y k ∈ AP (w 1 · · · w i k+1 −1 ), we have the desired conclusion with y 1 · · · y k+1 of length k + 1.
3) If (16) holds for all y ∈ ∆ * and v ∈ ∆ ∪ { }, then an iterative calculation shows that (16) holds for all y ∈ ∆ * and all v ∈ ∆ * . Hence it is enough to prove that (16) holds for all y ∈ ∆ * and t ∈ ∆ ∪ { }.
Suppose that w ∈ AP −1 (y)AP −1 (t) for y ∈ ∆ * and t ∈ ∆ ∪ { }. Then
Since y ∈ AP (w 1 ) and t ∈ AP (w 2 ), it follows that yt ∈ AP (w 1 )AP (w 2 ) = AP (w), which implies w ∈ AP −1 (yt). We therefore have AP −1 (y)AP −1 (t) ⊂ AP −1 (yt).
Next we prove the converse inclusion. If t = , then we have from AP ( ) = { } that
Let us next consider the case t = . Suppose that w ∈ AP −1 (yt) for y ∈ ∆ * and t ∈ ∆. Since yt ∈ AP (w) and yt = , it follows that w = . Let w = w 1 · · · w n with w i ∈ Σ. From the item 2, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that y ∈ AP (w 1 · · · w i ) and t ∈ AP (w i+1 · · · w n ). Hence if we define w 1 := w 1 · · · w i and w 2 := w i+1 · · · w n , then
Hence w ∈ AP −1 (y)AP −1 (t). Thus AP −1 (y)AP −1 (t) ⊃ AP −1 (yt), which completes the proof.
B. Supervisors described by observers
Inspired by the non-attacked results in [30] , we first construct an observer that is resilient against replacement-removal attacks, which plays an important role in the representation of the supervisor f in (6).
Consider a specification automaton G K = (R, Σ, η, r 0 ) with a set ∆ of output symbols and an output map P : Σ → (∆ ∪ { }). We define the unobservable reach UR A (r) of each state r ∈ R under a replacement and removal attack A ∈ A by UR A (r) := z ∈ R : ∃u ∈ AP −1 ( ) s.t. z = η(r, u) , 
which can be extended to a set of states B ⊂ R by
To estimate the current state r of the specification automaton G K in the presence of a replacement-removal attack A ∈ A, the observer Obs A (G K ) = (R obs,A , ∆, η obs,A , r 0,obs,A ) is constructed in the following iterative procedure:
1) Define r 0,obs,A := UR A (r 0 ) ⊂ R and set R obs,A = {r 0,obs,A }.
2) For each set of states B ∈ R obs,A and t ∈ ∆, if η(r e , e) is defined for some r e ∈ B and e ∈ AP −1 (t) ∩ Σ, then define η obs,A (B, t) := UR A {r ∈ R : ∃r e ∈ B, e ∈ AP (t) −1 ∩ Σ s.t. r = η(r e , e)} (17) and add this set to R obs,A ; otherwise η obs,A (B, t) is not defined.
3) Go back to step 2) until no more sets can be added to R obs,A .
Fig. 3 illustrates the observer Obs
Example 1 (cont.): Consider the specification language K = L(G K ) and the attack A 1 as in Example 1. Fig. 4 shows the observers obtained through the procedure described above for the attacks A id (absence of attack) and A 1 . The structure of the observer Obs A 1 (G K ) is similar to that of Obs A id (G K ), but Obs A 1 (G K ) transitions by using only the length of the observed strings, which guarantees the robustness of K against replacement attacks.
The next result provides the realization of the P -supervisor f in (6) for the language L and the specification K. This realization is base on a specification automaton
with L(G K ) = K and a family of observer automata Obs A (G K ) designed using the procedure outlined above. Without loss of generality, we can restrict the domain of f to A∈A AP (K). 
(19)
Then the supervisor f in (6) can be obtained using
We can precompute the function Ψ(r obs,A ) for each observer state r obs,A and then can obtain the desired control action by looking at the current state r obs,A and the corresponding event set Ψ(r obs,A ) for all observers Obs A (G K ) (A ∈ A).
Remark 12:
The branch Φ A (y) = Σ u for y ∈ AP (K) in (19) implies that once an attack A and a corrupted output string y satisfy y ∈ AP (K), the corresponding observer Obs A (G K ) is not under operation because the actual attack must be different from the attack A that the observer assumes. Analogous to the case for linear time-invariant systems in [9] - [11] , once y / ∈ AP (K)
is detected, the supervisor can exclude that attack from further consideration and stop updating the corresponding observer.
C. Proof of Theorem 11
The following lemma shows that the state of Obs A (G K ) is the set containing all the the states of G K that could be reached from the initial state under the attack A.
Lemma 13: Consider a replacement-removal attack A. For all y ∈ L(Obs A (G K )), we have r ∈ η obs,A (r 0,obs,A , y) ⇔ ∃w ∈ AP −1 (y) s.t. r = η(r 0 , w).
The proof of Lemma 13 relies on a key technical result that provides a more direct representation of η obs,A in (17) without unobservable reaches UR A .
Lemma 14: Consider a replacement-removal attack A. Let B ∈ R obs,A and t ∈ ∆. If η(r e , e)
is defined for some r e ∈ B and e ∈ AP −1 (t), then we definē η obs,A (B, t) := r ∈ R : ∃r e ∈ B, e ∈ AP −1 (t) s.t. r = η(r e , e) .
Then
and η obs,A (B, t) =η obs,A (B, t).
Proof: First we prove (22) . To prove this, it suffices to show that for all B ∈ R obs,A and t ∈ ∆, η(r e , e)! for some r e ∈ B and e ∈ AP −1 (t) ∩ Σ ⇔ η(r e , e)! for some r e ∈ B and e ∈ AP −1 (t)
By construction, (⇒) holds. We prove (⇐) as follows. Assume that there existr e ∈ B and e ∈ AP −1 (t) such that η(r e ,ē) is defined. Since t ∈ AP (ē), Lemma 10 shows that there exist e 1 ∈ Σ * , e 2 ∈ Σ, and e 3 ∈ Σ * such that e = e 1 e 2 e 3 , ∈ AP (e 1 ), t ∈ AP (e 2 ), ∈ AP (e 3 ).
Since η(r e ,ē)!, we also obtain η(η(r e , e 1 ), e 2 )!. Therefore if we prove that
then (⇐) of (24) holds with r e = η(r e , e 1 ) and e = e 2 .
Let us show (26) . Since B ∈ R obs,A , it follows that B = UR A (B) for someB ⊂ R. From r e ∈ B, we haver e = η(r, u) for some r ∈B and u ∈ AP −1 ( ). Since ∈ AP (e 1 ), it follows that ue 1 ∈ AP −1 ( ). Thus η(r e , e 1 ) = η(r, ue 1 ) ∈ UR A (B) = B, which completes the proof of (22).
Next we prove (23) . To show η obs,A (B, t) ⊂η obs,A (B, t), suppose that z ∈ η obs,A (B, t). Then there exist r ∈ r ∈ R : ∃r e ∈ B, e ∈ AP (t) −1 ∩Σ s.t. r = η(r e , e) =: M and u ∈ AP −1 ( ) such that z = η(r, u). This implies that
eu).
Since eu ∈ AP −1 (t), it follows that z ∈η obs,A (B, t). Thus η obs,A (B, t) ⊂η obs,A (B, t)
To prove the reverse inclusion, pick z ∈η obs,A (B, t). Then ∃r e ∈ B,ē ∈ AP −1 (t) s.t. z = η(r e ,ē).
Since t ∈ AP (ē), it follows from Lemma 10 that there exist e 1 ∈ Σ * , e 2 ∈ Σ, and e 3 ∈ Σ * such that (25) holds. Furthermore, as discussed above,r e ∈ B and ∈ AP (e 1 ) lead to η(r e , e 1 ) ∈ B.
Since e 2 ∈ AP −1 (t) ∩ Σ, we have η(r e , e 1 e 2 ) = η η(r e , e 1 ), e 2 ∈ M.
Finally, since ∈ AP (e 3 ), it follows that z = η(r e , e 1 e 2 e 3 ) ∈ UR A (M ) = η obs,A (B, t).
Thus η obs,A (B, t) ⊃η obs,A (B, t). This completes the proof.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 13.
Proof of Lemma 13:
We prove (21) by induction on the word length. Since
we have that if y = , then r ∈ η obs,A (r 0,obs,A , y) ⇔ ∃u ∈ AP −1 ( ) s.t. r = η(r 0 , u), which means that (21) holds for y = .
Suppose now that (21) holds for all words y ∈ L Obs A (G K ) of length n ≥ 0. Pick a word y t ∈ L Obs A (G K ) of length n + 1, where y ∈ L Obs A (G K ) has length n. By Lemma 14, η obs,A (r 0,obs,A , y t) = η obs,A η obs,A (r 0,obs,A , y ), t =η obs,A η obs,A (r 0,obs,A , y ), t
We therefore have r ∈ η obs,A (r 0,obs,A , y t) ⇔ ∃r e ∈ η obs,A (r 0,obs,A , y ), e ∈ AP −1 (t) s.t. r = η(r e , e). (27) Since y has length n, we know by the induction hypothesis that r e ∈ η obs,A (r 0,obs,A , y ) if and only if
Combining this with (27) , we obtain r ∈ η obs,A (r 0,obs,A , y t) ⇔ ∃w ∈ AP −1 (y ), e ∈ AP −1 (t) s.t. r = η(r 0 , w e).
To prove (⇒) in (21), suppose that r ∈ η obs,A (r 0,obs,A , y t). Then from (28) and Lemma 10,
and r = η(r 0 , w), which implies that (⇒) in (21) holds.
Let us next show that (⇐) in (21) holds. Conversely, suppose that ∃w ∈ AP −1 (y t) s.t. r = η(r 0 , w).
Since AP −1 (y t) = AP −1 (y )AP −1 (t) from Lemma 10, it follows that
Since r = η(r 0 , w e), (28) shows that r ∈ η obs,A (r 0,obs , y t), and hence we have (⇐) in (21).
Next we prove L Obs
by induction on the word length. The basis of induction is the empty string that belongs to L Obs A (G K ) by definition, and belongs to
Suppose now that L Obs A (G K ) and AP L(G K ) have exactly the same words of length n ≥ 0, and pick a word y t ∈ ∆ * of length n+1, where y and t have length n and 1, respectively.
Lemma 14 shows
⇔ η obs,A (r 0,obs,A , y t)! ⇔ η obs,A (r 0,obs,A , y )! ∧ ∃r e ∈ η obs,A (r 0,obs,A , y ), e ∈ AP −1 (t) s.t. η(r e , e)! .
Suppose that y t ∈ L(Obs A (G K )). We do not use the induction hypothesis to prove that
as well, it follows from (21) that r e ∈ η obs,A (r 0,obs,A , y ) ⇔ ∃w ∈ AP −1 (y ) s.t. r e = η(r 0 , w ).
Combining this with (29), we have
Hence w := w e satisfies AP (w) = AP (w )AP (e) y t and w ∈ L(G K ), which implies
Conversely, suppose that y t ∈ AP L(G K ) . Then there exists w ∈ L(G K ) such that y t ∈ AP (w). Lemma 10 shows that
for some
Since y has length n, the induction hypothesis gives y ∈ L Obs A (G K ) . Hence we have η obs,A (r 0,obs,A , y )! and (30). To prove y t ∈ L Obs A (G K ) , it suffices from (29) and (30) to show that (31) holds. Define w := w 1 and e := w 2 . Then we have w ∈ AP −1 (y ) and e ∈ AP −1 (t)
from (32) . Moreover,
leads to η(r 0 , w e)!. We therefore obtain (31) .
completes the proof.
Using Lemma 13, we finally provide the proof of Theorem 11.
Proof of Theorem 11:
for all y ∈ A∈A AP (K). Then the supervisor f in (6) satisfies
Hence, in order to obtain (20) , we need to prove that f A = Φ A for each A ∈ A.
By definition, f A (y) = Σ u = Φ A (y) for all y ∈ AP (K). Suppose that y ∈ AP (K). Since L(G K ) = K, it follows from Lemma 13 that
Since η(r 0 , wσ)! means that w, wσ ∈ K, it follows that σ ∈ Σ c : ∃r ∈ η obs,A (r 0,obs,A , y) s.t. η(r, σ)! = {σ ∈ Σ c : ∃w ∈ AP −1 (y) s.t. wσ ∈ K} = {σ ∈ Σ c : ∃w ∈ K s.t. y ∈ AP (w), wσ ∈ K} which implies that f A (y) = Φ A (y) also for every y ∈ AP (K). This completes the proof.
IV. TEST FOR OBSERVABILITY UNDER REPLACEMENT-REMOVAL ATTACKS
In this section, we propose an observability test under replacement-removal attacks in Section III A, inspired by product automata [32] .
A. Product automata
Consider a language L = L(G) generated by a finite automaton G = (X, Σ, ξ, x 0 ). We want to test the observability under an attack set A of a specification language
For each A, A ∈ A, we construct a product automaton T A,A = (Q, Σ T,A,A , δ A,A , q 0 ) for the observability test, where Q := R × X × R, q 0 := (r 0 , x 0 , r 0 ), and 
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B. Observability test
For each A, A ∈ A, let us denote by Ac A,A (Q) the set of accessible states from the initial state q 0 by some string in L(T A,A ), that is,
The following theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for observability under replacement-removal attacks, which can be checked using a set of test automatons {T A,A } A,A ∈A .
Theorem 15: Consider a replacement-removal attack set A and the test automaton T A,A defined above. Assume that a prefix-closed language K ⊂ L(G) is controllable. Then K is not P -observable under A if and only if there exist A, A ∈ A, (r, x , r ) ∈ Ac A,A (Q), and σ ∈ Σ c such that
The proof of Theorem 15 is provided in the next subsection.
Remark 16 (Computational complexity of observability test for replacement-removal attacks):
The number of the elements in Ac A,A (Q) is at most |X| · |R| 2 . Since we only have to check the state transition of the elements in Ac A,A (Q) driven by a controllable event, the total computational complexity to test observability is O(|X| · |R| 2 · |Σ c | · |A| 2 ) for the replacement-removal attack case. This complexity is the same as the one we derived in Remark 8 for insertion-removal attacks.
Example 1 (cont.): Consider again the language L(G), the specification language K = L(G K ), and the attack set A = {A 2 , A 3 } in Example 1. To check observability under A by Theorem 15, we need to construct four test automatons T A 2 ,A 2 , T A 3 ,A 3 , T A 3 ,A 2 , and T A 2 ,A 3 . We see from T A 3 ,A 2
in Fig. 5 that K is not observable under A. In fact, for the state (r 2 , x 1 , r 1 ) and the controllable event c ∈ Σ c , we have η(r 2 , c)!, ξ(x 1 , c)!, and ¬η(r 1 , c)!.
Thus K is not observable under A, which is consistent with the discussion in Example 1. 
C. The proof of Theorem 15
Using this notation, we define
Also, we define Σ 0 T,A,A := {( , )} and for each n ≥ 1, 
Proof: We prove (34) and (35) by induction on the word length of (w, w ). The basis of induction is the empty string ( , ). Since δ A,A (q 0 , ( , )) = q 0 = (r 0 , x 0 , r 0 ) and η(r 0 , ) = r 0 , ξ(x 0 , ) = x 0 , η(r 0 , ) = r 0 , it follows that (34) and (35) hold.
Suppose now that for all (w, w ) ∈ Σ n T,A,A with n ≥ 0, if δ A,A q 0 , (w, w ) is defined, then (34) and (35) hold. Let (w,w ) ∈ Σ n+1 T,A,A satisfies δ A,A q 0 , (w,w ) is defined. Then there exist (w, w ) ∈ Σ n T,A,A and (σ, σ ) ∈ Σ T,A,A such that (w,w ) = (w, w )(σ, σ ) and
We know by the induction hypothesis that η(r 0 , w), ξ(x 0 , w ), and η(r 0 , w ) are defined and that δ A,A q 0 , (w, w ) = η(r 0 , w), ξ(x 0 , w ), η(r 0 , w ) . Hence we see from the second statement of (36) that η(r 0 ,w) = η η(r 0 , w), σ is defined. Similarly, ξ(x 0 ,w ) and η(r 0 ,w ) are defined.
Furthermore, we have
Thus the desired statements (34) and (35) 
In the proof of Lemma 18, we use the lemma below that provides the property of Σ * T,A,A and a set equivalent toL A,A .
Lemma 19: Consider two replacement-removal attacks A, A and the test automaton T A,A defined as in Section IV A. For all (w, w ) ∈ Σ * × Σ * , we have
Moreover, the languageL A,A in (37) satisfieŝ
Proof: (⇒ of (38)) We show the proof by induction on the word length (w, w ) ∈ Σ Suppose that all words (w, w ) ∈ Σ n T,A,A satisfies AP (w)∩A P (w) = ∅. Let (w,w ) ∈ Σ n+1 T,A,A . Then there exists (w, w ) ∈ Σ n T,A,A and (σ, σ ) ∈ Σ T,A,A such thatw = wσ andw = w σ . The induction hypothesis shows that AP (w) ∩ A P (w ) = ∅, and by construction, we have AP (σ) ∩ A P (σ ) = ∅. Thus AP (w) ∩ A P (w ) = ∅.
(⇐ of (38)) We split the proof into two cases: . . .
∈ AP (w im+1 · · · w l ) = AP (w im+1 ) · · · AP (w l ), which implies that ∈ AP (w i ) for all i = i 1 , . . . , i m . We also have similar indices for w . Thus Then we see from (35) in Lemma 17 that (r, x , r ) = δ A,A q 0 , (w, w ) , and hence (r, x , r ) ∈ Ac A,A (Q). Furthermore, since wσ ∈ K and w σ ∈ L \ K, we have (33) .
(⇐) Conversely, suppose that A, A ∈ A, (r, x , r ) ∈ Ac A,A (Q), and σ ∈ Σ c satisfy (33) . Since (r, x , r ) ∈ Ac A,A (Q), it follows that (r, x , r ) = δ A,A q 0 , (w, w ) for some (w, w ) ∈ L(T A,A ), and hence Lemma 17 shows that r = η(r 0 , w), x = ξ(x 0 , w ), r = η(r 0 , w ).
In conjunction with (33) , this leads to wσ ∈ K and w σ ∈ L \ K. On the other hand, since (w, w ) ∈ L(T A,A ), it follows from Lemma 18 that w, w ∈ K and AP (w) ∩ A P (w ) = ∅. Thus Proposition 3 shows that K is not observable under the attack pair {A, A }. This completes the proof.
V. CONCLUSION
We studied supervisory control for DESs in the presence of attacks. We defined a new notion of observability under attacks and proved that this notion combined with conventional controllability is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a supervisor enforcing the specification language despite the attacks. Furthermore, we showed that the usual notion of observability can be used to test the new notion of observability in the case of insertion-removal attacks. The automaton representation and the observability test were extended for replacement-removal attacks. In [35] , we also define normality under attacks and discuss the existence of a maximally permissive
supervisor. An important direction for future work is to combine robustness against attack with confidentiality and integrity in supervisory control for DESs.
